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Abstract: A step into just about any state prison in the United States reveals an 
institution plagued by over-population, with just about every prison running at more than 
100% capacity. The problem, of course, is not new but one that has received great 
attention. In the past decade or so the solution has been privatization of state prisons. 
Proponents of privatization have pushed forth the idea that private institutions are the 
solution to prison overcrowding. However, by looking to for-profit private institutions as 
a means to resolving the problems of the penal system, are legislators in fact ensuring that 
the problems continue?  This article will show that there is indeed a “Catch-22.”  Prison 
privatization is the solution to a problem, which if solved would render the need for 
privatization obsolete.  Thus, if private institutions actually solved the prison population 
crisis there would be no need for privatization and no profits.  The end result is that the 
privatization industry works to ensure the penal system’s problems continue and that 
they, the private companies, continue to exist as the solution.   
 
2The Catch-22 in Prison Privatization: 
The Problem with the Solution 
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified 
that a concern for one's safety in the face of dangers that were real 
and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy 
and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he 
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more 
missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he 
didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was 
crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and 
had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute 
simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful 
whistle. 
"That's some catch, that Catch-22," he [Yossarian] observed. 
"It's the best there is," Doc Daneeka agreed.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The overcrowding plaguing the U.S. penal system has been well documented over 
the past decade or so.2 Studies as to the cause of the current crisis have been published 
and solutions sought.3 Yet the problem has only worsened with no end to overcrowding 
in sight.4 Legislators have thus sought to remedy the problem through the use of a 
method rooted in western and especially American history.  While never used as 
extensively as in recent years, privatization of various prison operations and at times 
 
1 JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22_ (Simon & Schuster 1996) (1961). 
2 See Pamela M. Rosenblatt, The Dilemma of Overcrowding in the Nation’s Prisons: 
What are Constitutional Conditions and What Can Be Done?, 8 N.Y.L.SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
489 (1991); see also Terrence P. Thornberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional Challenges to 
Prison Overcrowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 313 
(1983); infra note 19; infra notes 76-120. 
3 Id.
4 See infra notes 76 -120 and accompanying text regarding the continuing prison 
population problem.  
3whole facilities has been a major part of the history of the U.S. penal system.5 Thus, 
when overcrowding in prison facilities emerged as a crisis, privatization was not a far 
fetched potential solution.6 Those in favor of privatization argued that it would save the 
government ever stretching resources, made even scarcer by the growing prison 
population;7 they argued that privatization would be able to provide higher quality of 
confinement and ultimately resolve the overcrowding problem.8 Yet privatization on a 
whole sale level brings its own issues to the table, many of which have been discussed 
extensively, including whether privatization does in fact provide higher quality of 
confinement,9 whether it is in fact cost efficient, and whether privatization can provide 
better accountability.10 Additionally, problems and issues regarding the constitutionality 
of privatization have been raised though not necessarily answered.11 There is, however, 
one particular issue that has thus far received limited coverage.  That issue is whether for 
profit privatization of prisons creates a conflict of interest? Or rather: By allowing for 
profit privatization is there a “Catch-22”?     
I phrase the issue in terms of Joseph Heller’s Catch 22 because the problem 
inquires into the circularity of the privatization issue: By looking to for-profit private 
institutions as a means to resolving the problems of the penal system, are legislators in 
fact ensuring that the problems continue?  This article will show that there is indeed a 
 
5 See infra notes 14-75 and accompanying text regarding the history of privatization in 
the United States penal system. 
6 Id. 
7 See infra notes 76-119 and accompanying test regarding the rationale behind the 
movement towards prison privatization in modern United States. 
8 Id. 
9 See infra notes 120-144 and accompanying text regarding issues and problems that 
accompany prison privatization 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
4“Catch-22.”  Prison privatization is the solution to a problem, which if solved would 
render the need for privatization obsolete.  Thus, if private institutions actually solved the 
prison population crisis there would be no need for privatization and no profits.  The end 
result is that the privatization industry works to ensure the penal system’s problems 
continue and that they, the private companies, continue to exist as the solution.  
The first part of this article summarizes the extensive history of privatization in 
America including the early history and various forms of privatization starting from 
before American independence.  It also discusses the rationale behind the resurgence of 
prison privatization, specifically the prison population crisis and finally it discusses some 
of the issues and concerns that accompany the use of privatization.   
Part two of this comment makes the point that the privatization industry partakes 
in the creation of state legislation that increases the prison population.  This part of the 
comment starts by analyzing the prison privatization industry and how it provides an 
incentive for various institutions within the industry to play a part in the political process.  
It then specifically looks at the Corrections Corporation of America and its involvement 
with American Legislative Executive Council in the creation of tough on crime 
legislation.  Finally, part three concludes that for-profit prison privatization does not 
solve prison overcrowding but in fact ensures that overcrowding continues in order to 
guarantee its existence.  
II. BACKGROUND
Over the past several years the government, both state and federal has sought to 
outsource its duties of managing the incarcerated criminal population to the private 
5sector.12 While the concept is not new, it has become a much more used option in 
managing prisons, especially for state governments.13 
a. History
The involvement of private enterprises in the American correctional services has 
an extensive history dating to before American Independence.  The persistent use of 
privatization seemingly stems from an Anglo-American population that found itself in 
direct conflict with its government’s exercise of power, thus breeding skepticism of 
governmental authority.14 
The need to transport felons from England to the English Colonies provided an 
opportunity for private parties to make money.  Convicted felons, pardoned on the 
condition of being sold into servitude arrived shortly after English colonists in 1607.15 
They were transported to America by private entrepreneurs.16 This means of transporting 
felons provided the British government with an efficient way to decrease the English 
penal system’s population without having to spend too much.17 
Prisoners were required to pay for their incarceration in Colonial times, a product 
of an entrepreneurial system that predominated.18 Naturally those who were too poor to 
 
12 Dana Joel, A Guide to Prison Privatization, Heritage Research (The Heritage 
Foundation, Wash., D.C.), May 24, 1988, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/BG650.cfm.  
13 Id. 
14 James Austin & Garry Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 9 (2001). The skepticism of governmental powers was prominently 
displayed as a result of Great Britain’s governing of the American Colonies, which then 
lead to the American Revolution. 
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector 
Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C.L. REV. 2209, 2210 (1998).  
6afford their “rent” were forced into a type of slavery, working for the prison so that they 
could pay off their debts.19 
By the 18th century an alternative to servitude emerged.20 The American 
Colonies, which had based much of its penal system on English custom, began to contract 
supervisory duties to private contractors for a fixed fee.21 A head-jailer, though 
employed by the government, was in fact deemed an independent operator since he made 
profits off of the operation of prison facilities by employing the inmates as laborers and 
craftsmen.22 However, while technically employed, the inmates of such facilities rarely 
received any income.23 
Payments were extracted for special services, such as better meals 
or other privileges.  Some money was given to the jailer (often the 
sheriff) for basic services.  But it was widely accepted that jailers 
could charge additional money for virtually any type of special 
benefits.24 
In some states where contracts to lease out prison labor existed, companies 
provided raw materials and inmates produced products that were then sold by private 
companies.25 For instance in 1790, in hopes of greater economic profits, the 
Pennsylvania Walnut Street Jail supervised prisoners as they labored to transform raw 
materials purchased by private organizations into sellable products.26 Other states leased 
 
19 Id. 
20 Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 9. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 CLAIR A. CRIPE & MICHAEL G. PEARLMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORRECTIONAL 
MANAGEMENT 378 (Jones & Bartlett Publishers 2d ed 2004) (1997). 
25 Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 10. 
26 Id. The venture despite its hopes of attaining economic profits was an economic 
disappointment. Id. 
7their inmates out to private farms or companies.27 In 1816, under pressure from the New 
York Legislature to ensure that it was self sufficient, the Auburn Prison “[a]ctively 
contracted with private companies who willingly paid for the cheap prisoner labor.”28 
Soon after, Louisiana, California, and Texas followed New York’s lead with slight 
variations.29 
Thirteen states had contracts to lease out prison labor with private enterprises by 
1885.30 These private enterprises had lobbied and persuaded government officials that 
prisons would operate at a much more efficient level by such enterprises, which had 
previous experience with law enforcement.31 They argued that private entities could run 
prisons cheaper and that there would be less corruption.32 They claimed that private 
institutions would be better at rehabilitation than the government while being financially 
rewarding at the same time.33 
Prison overcrowding and the cost of managing prisons had provided an incentive 
for privatization.  In fact by the mid 1880’s Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, and 
Kentucky began to privatize prisons to some degree.34 Further, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and 
Michigan have all at one point in time either leased prisons out to private firms or have 
had prisons run by private firms.35 
27 Id. Texas for instance passed legislation in 1860’s allowing inmate labor to be 
contracted out to the private sector. Id. 
28 Duitsman, supra note 18, at 2214. 
29 Id. Lousiana leased an entire prison to the private sector. Id. 
30 Robert D. McCrie, Privatizing Corrections: The Delicate Balance in PRIVATIZING 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 19-32 (G. Bowman, S. Hakim & P. Seidenstat eds., 
Transaction Publishers 1993).  
31 Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 10. 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 See Duitsman, supra note 18, at 2215.  
8The lack of any independent oversight or monitoring institutions permitted 
corruption and bribery to take over the convict lease system.36 Conditions in private 
prisons had become horrific,37 “work[ing] inmates to death, beat[ing] or kill[ing] them for 
minor rule infractions, or fail[ing] to provide them with the quantity and quality of life’s 
necessities (food, clothing, shelter).”38 As a result, investigations into cruelty and 
mismanagement were conducted by states throughout much of the country.39 
Additionally, public support for rehabilitation of criminals grew, demanding greater 
efforts towards the use of prisons for reforming prisoners as opposed to merely 
imprisoning them.40 Public support resonated with the legislature and in 1905, President 
Theodore Roosevelt signed an executive order prohibiting the employment of criminal 
labor on federal projects.41 The Hawes-Cooper Act in 1929 gave states the choice of 
banning the importation of inmate products from other states.42 During the Great 
Depression, the federal and state governments passed laws curtailing the use of inmates 
in private enterprises.43 
By the 1920’s America’s ideology of privatization as a means of managing 
prisons was replaced with one that believed in greater governmental involvement.44 The 
 
36 Id. at 2215-16. 
37 See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Private Prisons 2-3, Nat’l Inst. of Justice Crime File Study 
Guide No. NCJ-104561, (1988). Meal menus for prisoners included “spoiled beef, 
maggoty hams, and coarse bread.” Kenneth Lamont, Chronicles of San Quentin 45 
(1961).  
38 Duitsman, supra note 18, at  2216.  
39 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 11.  
40 N. Miller & W. Jensen, Reform of Federal Prison Industries, 1 Justice System Journal 
1, 13 (1974).   
41 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 11. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
9end of convict leasing programs was replaced with state-run institutions.45 American 
correctional services were almost entirely provided by the government and at the 
government’s expense.46 Statutes were enacted, delegating administrative functions to 
government agencies, staffed by government employees.47 However the financial tolls 
on the government eventually lead to the privatization of certain prison services.48 For 
instance, food preparation, vocational training, inmate transportation, medical services, 
dental services, and mental health services were contracted out to private non-profit and 
for-profit institutions.49 
In the 1970s, privatization of prisons re-emerged as a means of managing 
correctional facilities.50 The operation of juvenile correctional facilities were first to be 
privatized.51 This was perhaps a response to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 
1974, which encouraged communities to find alternative, non-traditional means of 
incarcerating juvenile delinquents.52 Pennsylvania was the first state to contract the entire 
operation of a high-security facility housing male juvenile delinquents out to a private 
institution.53 Control of the Weaversville Intensive Treatment located in North Hampton, 
Pennsylvania was given to RCA services in 1976.54 Florida followed Pennsylvania, but 
 
45 Id. 
46 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 11.  
47 See Cripe, supra note 24 at 381.  
48 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 11.  
49 Id. 
50 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 11. 
51 Alexis M. Durham, The Future of Correctional Privatization: Lessons from the Past in 
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 36 (G. Bowman, S. Hakim & P. Siedenstat 
eds., Transaction Publishers 1993).  
52 Patrick Boyer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: 
Public Versus Private Management, 48 JLECON 549, 550 (2005).   
53 See Austin & Coventry supra note 14, at 12; See Duitsman supra note 18 at 2217. 
54 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 12.  
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not until 1982.55 The trend towards privatizing facilities holding juveniles has continued 
in the United States.56 
In the 1980s the United States Immigration and Nationalization Services (INS) 
also looked to privatization as a means of holding illegal aliens entering into the 
country.57 INS had contracts with two private companies for the detention of illegal 
aliens by the end of 1984.58 At the end of 1988, there were seven private INS detention 
facilities  and they held almost 30% of illegal aliens in INS custody.59 One of the private 
companies with which the INS contracted was the Correctional Corporation of America 
(CCA), which was incorporated in 1983.60 
The CCA is the largest private prison corporation and its history outlines much of 
the growth in prison privatization over the past twenty years, especially since it has been 
the leader in prison privatization.61 CCA’s initial ventures into privatization thus 
revolved around immigration facilities and juvenile detention centers.62 In 1984, for 
instance, the CCA assumed management of a non-secure juvenile facility located in 
Memphis, Tennessee.63 Then in 1989 it designed, built, and managed the Shelby 
 
55 Charles Logan & Sharla Rausch, Punishment for Profit: The Emergence of Private 
Enterprise Prisons, JUSTICE QUARTERLY 2(3), 303, _ (Sept. 1985).  
56 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 12. By 1990 almost 90 percent of states had 
at least one contract with a nonprofit private corporation and 60 percent of states had at 
least one contract with a for-profit corporation to operate a juvenile correctional facility. 
Robert B. Levinson & William J. Taylor, ACA Studies Privatization in Juvenile 
Corrections, 53 CORRECTIONS TODAY 242, 248 (1991) 
57 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14, at 12. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Corrections Corp. of America, http://www.correctionscorp.com/ccahistory.html (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2006) 
61 See Michael A. Hallett, Race, Crime, and For-Profit Imprisonment, PUNISHMENT &
SOCIETY 4(3), 369 (2002). 
62 Id. 
63 See Corrections Corp. of America, supra note 60.  
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Training Center for juveniles.64 By the late 1980s and early 1990s CCA had expanded to 
contracting for the right to manage various facilities, stretching to even medium-security 
prisons.65 CCA’s Winn Correctional Center, built in 1990, was the first medium-security 
private prison in the United States.66 Located in Winn Parish, Louisiana, the center was 
designed, financed and built by the state.67 Soon after, CCA was making contracts to not 
only design and build prisons but to manage maximum security prisons.68 In 1992, CCA 
was responsible for the first maximum security private prison facility under direct 
contract with a federal agency, when it designed and built the 256-bed Leavenworth 
Detention Center, which the company operates for the U.S. Marshals Service.69 
The trend towards privatization in the United States is made all the more obvious 
when looking at CCA.  Today CCA is a publicly traded company on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and holds 52 percent of all privatization contracts.70 It has 
approximately 69,000 beds in 63 facilities, including 38 owned facilities, under contract 
for management in 19 states and in the District of Columbia.71 Additionally there are 
several other companies similar to CCA that hold the remainder of private prison 
 
64 Id (noting that the facility was also located in Memphis, Tennessee). 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See Corrections Corp. of America, supra note 60.  
70 See Hallett supra 61 at 376. 
71 See Corrections Corp. of America, supra note 60. 
12
contracts.72 In total, today there are 158 private facilities in the U.S.73 located in 30 
states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.74 
b. Overcrowding and The Rationale for Privatization in Modern America
Not surprisingly, the very same reasons that lead to prison privatizations earlier in 
American history led to the resurgence in privatizing prisons again, during the 1980’s.75 
The high costs of managing prisons and an increasing problem with prison overcrowding 
have led to renewed support for prison privatization.76 Moreover, the public support for 
prisoner rehabilitation that sounded the death knell for privatization during the 1920s 
turned into public frustration, as it became more and more obvious that those who had 
been incarcerated and freed were returning to the prison system within a short period of 
time.77 
Claims that the government is incapable of satisfactorily managing prison 
facilities have also contributed to support for privatization as a solution.78 The 
tremendous increase in privatized facilities is rooted in the public discontent with the 
rehabilitation failures of the penal system during the 1980’s.79 However, the failure to 
 
72 See Hallett supra 61 at 376.  
73 Austin supra note 14 at iii. Of the 158 private facilities, there are currently 43 in Texas, 
24 in California, and 9 in Colorado. Id. at 4.  
74 C.W. Thomas, A “Real Time” Statistical Profile, Gainsville: University of Florida, 
Department of Criminology, Law and Society, available at http://www.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/. 
Texas has the most private prisons, with 43; and California has the second most with 24. 
Id. 
75 See Douglas W. Dunham, Inmates’ Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLUM.
L.REV. 1475 (1986) (discussing the constitutionality of prison privatization).  
76 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14 at 13.  
77 Id. 
78 See Dunham supra note 75 at 1477, 1478.  
79 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14 at iii.  
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rehabilitate is partly due to overcrowding in prison facilities,80 which additionally creates 
a greater pull on government resources.81 Thus, while there are several reasons why 
privatization has gained support they are mainly rooted in overcrowding.  
 As of June 30, 1995 the U.S. inmate population was 1,104,074.82 As of June 30, 
2005 the inmate population in both federal and state prisons was 2,186,230.83 Such an 
increase has lead to prison facilities that are filled to 20% over capacity.84 Additionally, 
the United States currently has an incarceration rate of 724 per 100,000 residents, which 
is most in the world.85 In fact, in recent years there have been myriad of cases in federal 
circuit courts that have found prisons in violation of the Constitution due to 
overcrowding.86 
The overcrowding of prisons, while a persistent problem in the United States’ 
penal system has only recently become an unmanageable ordeal.87 There are several 
 
80 See Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D.V.I. 1997) (requiring the reduction of 
a prison’s population to improve its unconstitutional conditions); Albro v. County of 
Onondaga, 627 F. Supp. 1280,1288 (N.D.N.Y 1986) (same); Gates v. Collier, 423 F. 
Supp. 732, 743-44 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (same); see also Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 
396 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).   
81 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 14  
82 Id. 
83 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics (2006), available at1.
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm.  
84 Paul Van Slambrouck, U.S. Prisons-Under Pressure-Shows Increase in Violence.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 6, 1998, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1998/0806/080698.us.us.2.html.  
85 The Sentencing Project, New Incarceration Figures: Growth in Population Continues 
1, http://www.sentencing project.org/pds/1044.pdf (last visited December 22, 2006). 
86 See Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that medical care 
at prison was inadequate by constitutional standards and that prison was 
unconstitutionally overcrowded); also see Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 
1978); Lareau v. Masnon, 651 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1981) (upholding District Court Judge’s 
finding that the 8th amendment had been violated in a Maryland prison warranting 
judicial direction that overcrowding be eliminated); Naumi v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 
1996) 
87 See Duitsman supra note 18, at 2216.  
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reasons for overcrowding all of which essentially stem from a change in public 
perceptions of the United States penal system.88 Mandatory sentencing, cynicism 
towards prisoner rehabilitation, “truth in sentencing” laws, and overcrowding itself have 
all contributed.89 
Lawmakers implement mandatory sentencing laws in order to lengthen the 
duration of time served by offenders as well as to reduce the ability of judges and parole 
boards to reduce time served by offenders.90 Particularly targeted by mandatory 
sentencing laws have been drug-related crimes.91 Thus, in 1986 Congress passed the 
Drug Abuse Act, which created mandatory minimum sentences based on the type of drug 
and quantity possessed.92 Mandatory sentencing was brought on by a change in public 
perceptions rather than an increase in criminal activity. 93 
[T]he nation shifted its focus away from addressing the ‘root 
causes’ of crime and the rehabilitation of criminals towards making 
crime penalties more swift, certain and severe. . . California passed 
the Determining Sentencing Law in 1977, which, among other 
things, embraced punishment as the purpose of prison, required 
mandatory prison sentences for many offenses formerly eligible for 
probation, and dramatically increased the rate at which probation 
and parole violators were returned to prison.  As a result, 
California’s corrections population sky-rocketed.94 
88 See Austin & Coventry supra note 14.  
89 Id. 
90 See Hallett supra note 61, at 372-73.  
91 Id. 
92 Carla I. Barrett, Does the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address the 
Problems Posed by Prison Overcrowding? If Not, What Will?, 39 NEW ENGL. L. REV.
391, 396 (2005). 
93 Malcom M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment, PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY, 4(3) 321, 
322 (2002). 
94 Id. 
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Because of the increased implementation of mandatory minimum sentences, inmates 
remain in prisons longer.95 Consequently, prisons continue to fill without simultaneously 
emptying and the prison population continues to rise.96 
Additionally, the United States has increasingly sought imprisonment as the most 
desired form of punishment, thus contributing to prison overcrowding.97 In general an 
American perception toward the penal system is one of cynicism towards rehabilitation.98 
Therefore, because of populism99 most U.S. jurisdictions have overhauled their 
sentencing laws and policies, usually to reduce officials’ discretion and make penalties 
harsher.100 Furthermore, while the volume of criminal drug activity has not increased, 
mandatory sentencing has lead to longer sentencing terms for drug offenders.101 
The overcrowding problem is one that feeds off of itself.  The tremendous 
increase in the number of incarcerated individuals have lead to horrific conditions within 
prisons leading to Eighth Amendment violations,102 and compelling one commentator to 
observe prison conditions as “shock[ing] the conscience, if not the stomach.”103 The 
prison overcrowding problem has created a culture that subjects inmates to a violent, 
 
95 See Barrett supra note 92 at 396.  
96 Id. 
97 See Austin supra note 14. 
98 See Barrett supra note 92 at 397. 
99 “Populism is a political response that favors popularity over other policy 
considerations” JULIAN V. ROBERTS, LORETTA J. STALANS, DAVID INDERMAUR & MIKE 
HOUGH, PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION LESSONS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES, 3
(Oxford University Press 2003).   
100 Id. 
101 See Hallett supra note 61 at 371. 
102 Richard D. Nobleman, Wilson v. Seiter: Prison Conditions and the Eighth Amendment 
Standard, 24 PAC. L.J. 275, 279 (1992).  Such violations included insufficient medical 
treatment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (1976), inadequate diet, overcrowding, 
widespread violence, unprofessional security personnel, and the length of time inmates 
spent in isolation, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1978). 
103 Ira P. Robbins, Symposium, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40
VAND. L. REV. 813, 815 (1987).  
16
hostile and anti-social environment; one that often leaves the inmates incapable of 
dealing with society upon their release.104 Prison overcrowding is directly linked to 
prison violence.105 Cramped conditions result in frustration, restlessness, and short 
tempers,106 ultimately resulting in recidivism in various forms, including assault and 
rape.107 Courts have even acknowledged the correlation between deplorable conditions 
and inmate violence.108 Victim/inmates of certain forms of violence (assault, battery or 
rape) are more likely to commit crimes after being released.109 In fact most inmates 
released from state prisons will be re-arrested within three years; hence as additional 
persons are incarcerated there are not a proportional amount released and staying out of 
the prison system.110 
Public perception of the penal system has also contributed to overcrowding in 
another way.  Originally parole was conceived as a means of releasing prisoners once 
they had been reformed.111 However in the past several decades the use of parole has 
 
104 Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: the Next Generation of Prison 
Management 29 N.E. J. CRIM. & CIV. CON. 1, 32 2003.  
105 Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for Punishment,
34 S. TEX. L. REV. 443, 462-66 (1993) (writing that overcrowded conditions in prisons are 
a factor in higher rates of physical violence) 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 at 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (highlighting many 
severe violent acts that occur with “distressing frequency,” including “stabbings, 
bludgeonings, and homosexual rapes.”). 
109 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. 15601(8) (2000 & Supp. III 2004) 
(noting, amongst other findings, that “prison rape endangers the public safety by making 
brutalized inmates more likely to commit crimes when they are released”); see also 
Barrett, supra note 92, at 424 (writing that prisoners who are raped and subsequently do 
not receive adequate psychological treatment are more apt to commit more serious crimes 
after being released). 
110 See Barrett, supra note 92. One-fourth of all inmates released will be rearrested within 
six months of being released, while two-thirds will be rearrested within three years. Id. 
111 MICHAEL H. TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN 
PENAL CULTURE, 59 (Oxford University Press 2004) 
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steadily diminished.  Parole boards were given broad discretion to release an inmate if 
they determined the prisoner had been rehabilitated.112 But with public perception of 
legal system as soft, early releases have slowed down since the mid 1980s when “truth in 
sentencing” laws were created.113 These laws mandated that offenders serve from fifty to 
one hundred percent of their sentence as opposed to the forty percent that offenders 
served on average before.114 “Analysts say that the "truth-in-sentencing" laws have 
contributed to the rise in the prison population, exacerbating the overcrowded prison 
situation.”115 
Overcrowding has lead to a greater pull on government resources.116 In a 2001 
report, the Bureau of Justice detailed that state expenditures for the maintenance of prison 
facilities hit 29.5 billion dollars, an increase of five billion from the year before.117 In 
2001, it cost a state $22,650 to house an inmate in jail for the year.118 Furthermore, 
taxpayers in this country pay twenty-one billion dollars annually for the construction and 
maintenance of penal institutions.119 
c. Issues and Concerns with Prison Privatization
112 Id.  
113 See Barrett, supra note 92 
114 Id. 
115 Id., at 388-89.  
116 James J. Stephen, State Prison Expenditures, 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special 
Report, June 2004, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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Pennsylvania, wherein the state had to “postpone plans to build a courthouse and jail in 
its capital due to the fact that the $170 millions needed for construction was not available 
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The exorbitant amount of government resources required for maintaining prisons 
is only increasing, and has led to a belief that prison privatization may be a solution to the 
problems plaguing prisons.120 Advocates of privatization claim that private firms build, 
run, and manage prisons more efficiently in terms of cost.121 Additional support for 
privatization comes in term of the quality of confinement.122 However these claims have 
thus far not been indisputably proven.123 In fact there are numerous studies and articles 
written that both support as well as refute these claims.124 Some studies have sought to 
prove cost savings125 based on a belief that private corporations are not restricted by labor 
unions or strict purchasing guidelines.126 However, there is also extensive research 
proving the exact opposite, that there are no substantive cost savings from prison 
privatization.127 
120 See Dusitsman supra note 8, at 2213 (writing that “because reports establish that 
Federal correctional facilities are operating at 25% above capacity and that states are 
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Whether privatization actually does save the government money, privatization 
companies have attempted to and currently are making a profit,128 which in turn raises 
several issues of its own.  One of the main concerns is that private corrections companies 
will cut costs by reducing the quality of programs and services in private prisons and 
public prisons which rely on some privatized services.129 What’s more, many of the 
alleged savings that may come about from privatizing prisons may be achieved by hiring 
non-union employees, who are willing to work for less pay.130 These are significant 
savings since labor accounts for about two thirds of the cost of operating an average 
prison131 However, the result is that security staffs at private prisons have less experience 
and higher turnover rates than those at public prisons.132 
And, despite claims of better quality of confinement, there are questions as to 
whether it is in fact true.  Just as in the case of efficiency there is no definitive proof of 
private prisons offering better confinement quality per se.133 “In some studies the private 
prison faired worse . . ., whereas in others it outperformed the public prisons.”134 
Numerous other issues are raised by privatization.  Such issues include a debate 
over the fundamental responsibilities of governments to provide prison management as a 
way of maintaining fundamental needs of public safety135, environmental protection136,
128 See infra note 227-230 
129 Mathew Zito, Prison Privatization: Past and Present, American Legislative Council, 
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and national security.137 Many scholars argue that the government is not being 
responsible when it outsources its duties because punishment is a necessary function of 
the government.138 Many argue that it is not because punishment is a necessary function 
of government and when contracted out to private contractors, it “impoverishes the public 
sphere and weakens the moral bond between citizen and state”139 
Additional questions arise over the constitutional permissibility of privately 
managing prisons and prison facilities.140 “[P]rivatization raises troubling constitutional 
concerns as to the extent that proprietary firms can be entrusted to exercise decision 
making powers that affect the length, term, and conditions of prisoners’ confinement.”141 
The American Bar Association in 1986, thus called for a freeze on privatization until “the 
complex constitutional issues” are resolved.142 Thus far, these constitutional issues have 
not been dealt with.143 
On the whole prison privatization is an unproven method sought to remedy the 
traditional problems that have been plaguing the Prison system in the United States.  
While research has sought to show that it has been a successful venture there are still 
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numerous questions as to whether it truly solves prison problems.144 Additionally, 
privatization brings its own set of problems and issues that have not been fully analyzed.  
ANALYSIS
Over the past two decades there have been several problems with the government 
run penal system.145 These problems include accountability, cost efficiency, and 
recidivism however they have all been rooted in overcrowding.146 The problems are 
cyclical.  High rates of recidivism for instance have led the general public to lose faith in 
rehabilitation purposes of the penal system.147 The result has been the passage of laws 
that provide for more incarceration.148 As a result, there is even more overcrowding 
which creates a greater strain on already stressed government resources.149 This has led 
to horrific conditions within prisons and a culture of individuals unfit to live in the 
outside world.150 These individuals are prone to commit crimes and return shortly after 
release.151 Of course the end result is more overcrowding and so the cycle continues.152 
The issues of overcrowding led to privatization.153 In fact a 1998 survey conducted by 
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Abt. Associates Inc. ranking the various “objectives of prison administrators regarding 
prison privatization” in order of most important, found that reducing overcrowding was 
indeed the number one objective.154 The question is therefore whether prison 
privatization has succeeded in that endeavor?   
Legislators have seemingly failed to realize that an industry motivated by profit 
must have a steady flow of clients to maintain its existence and profits, and in order to 
become more successful they must increase that clientele.  In the prison privatization 
business, that clientele is the state and public who have looked to privatization as a means 
to the solution of overcrowding.155 The CCA recognized this fact in an annual report 
issued in 2004 entitled “Capitalizing on Our Strength,” in which it stated:  
Our company continued to benefit from an environment 
characterized by growing prison populations and a restricted supply 
of new prison beds resulting from budgetary constraints. Growth in 
the nation’s prison population continues to fuel the need for our 
services among our existing customers and is motivating additional 
states to consider the merits of partnering with CCA for outsourced 
corrections management.156 
Therefore, if the problem of overcrowding was solved institutions like the 
Corrections Corporation of America would have no future growth potential.  The logical 
conclusion is that the industry created to find the solution for overcrowding will look to 
ensure its future by facilitating overcrowding, which brings about a conflict of interest.  
 
reasons given by prison administrators’ for reinstating privatization were: Reducing 
overcrowding 86% of the time; acquiring additional beds quickly 75% of the time; 
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Stated plainly, prison privatization institutions are creating demand for their services by 
ensuring overcrowding continues.  
Of course while it is logical for one to believe that a conflict of interest should 
exist, the question still remains whether a conflict of interest does indeed exist.  By 
looking at the CCA it is clear that it does.  The entire industry including the CCA, is 
ensuring overcrowding persists through two similar means; first, through extensive 
participation in the creation of laws throughout the country and secondly, through their 
monetary contribution to politicians throughout the country.157 
This article supports the conclusion that a conflict of interest exists by inquiring 
into the corporate environment brought on by prison privatization laws and legislation.  I 
first examine whether the privatization industry has an incentive to exert its influences 
over the political and public landscape by discussing the prison privatization industry and 
its current make up in terms of corporate political action theories.  This article will then 
look into how it is that Prison Privatization corporations go about exerting that influence 
by looking closer at the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and its participation 
in the political system, and the success of such influence.  Finally, I will discuss whether 
Prison Privatization legislation has been successful in solving the problems that gave rise 
to them.  In conclusion, this article answers the question posed earlier: Whether prison 
privatization has succeeded in curbing the problem of overcrowding in the penal system?  
This paper argues that private institutions have not merely failed to do what they were 
sought to do but have now become part of the problem.   
a. The Prison Privatization Industry
157 See infra notes 184 – 228 and accompanying text for discussion on the various tactics 
and the manner in which the privatization industry and specifically, the CCA exerts its 
political influence. 
24
It is important to discuss and understand the current state of the prison 
privatization industry in order to understand how it facilitates a conflict of interest.  The 
government has sought solutions to the several persistent problems in the penal system,158 
which has created a potential benefit for prison privatization and so such institutions enter 
into the political arena in order to take advantage of that potential. Furthermore, because 
the majority of the market share in the industry belongs to one particular institution159 and 
because there are only several viable institutions there is an added incentive for those 
industries to become politically active.   
 Public Choice Theory explains how corporate decisions to partake in the political 
system rely on the circumstances of the industry.160 It presumes that firms perceiving a 
benefit in potential government policy enter the political arena to “purchase” that 
policy.161 The theory is based on the general view that rational individuals and 
institutions will act in their best interests.162 Thus, public choice theory explains political 
action on the part of institutions when there is some benefit or potential benefit to be 
exploited.163 When an industry sees the potential for some body of legislation to become 
law and where that legislation would benefit the industry, public choice theory would 
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dictate that the industry partake in the political process in an effort to ensure passage of 
such legislation.164 
Within the Private Prison industry, the question then arises whether any potential 
benefits actually exist in the political system.  A look into the history of the United States 
penal system clearly demonstrates that potential benefits exist today and have existed 
over the past two decades within the prison privatization context.  Prison overcrowding, 
accountability, expenditures and cost are problems that have been plaguing the penal 
system for many years and show no signs of slowing down.165 These factors have led to 
the potential benefit for politically active prison privatization companies since 
government policy has shifted towards the need for a viable solution to the problems of 
the penal system.  The need for a solution had led law makers to look to privatization as a 
means of lowering costs,166 which in large part increased along with the increase of 
prison overcrowding.167 
Crime soared in the 1970s and '80s.  The news media devoted 
headlines and the tops of newscasts to the crack epidemic and gang 
warfare.  Many Americans were alarmed.  Politicians from both 
major parties seized the issue and held on tight. For two decades, a 
political consensus prevailed: the nation needed tougher sentences, 
more police, more prisons.168 
164 See Getz supra note 160.  
165 See supra notes 65 – 108 and accompanying text for a discussion on issues affecting 
the penal system.  
166 See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion on the affect of monetary 
costs in the privatization decision.  
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This in turn has changed the public’s ideology on how to take care of prisoners and those 
who commit crimes.169 A “lock ‘em up and keep ‘em of the street” mentality has taken 
precedent over the past two decades.170 
The Prison Privatization industry has taken advantage of the potential that has 
emerged from the failure of government run prisons.  Recidivism is a continual problem 
for various reasons, including the failure of rehabilitation programs and the general lack 
of sanitary conditions in government run prisons.171 The result has provided the potential 
for manipulating the current prevailing notions through the purchase of tough on crime 
policy.  Yet merely because there exists a social and political atmosphere that would 
benefit the prison privatization industry, in order for political action to be profitable there 
must be certain circumstances within the industry itself.  
 The current make up of the privatization industry is dominated by one corporation 
while several others hold much smaller shares.172 The Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA) controls 51.4 % of total private prison capacity in the United States.173 
In contrast the firm controlling the second most in prison capacity is the Wackenhut 
Corrections Corporation (WCC), which controls 25% of total private prison capacity.174 
What is most surprising however is that in total there are only twelve institutions within 
the United States’ private prison industry,175 of which half control less than one percent 
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of the market share,176 thus leaving in essence only six privatization companies to run the 
market.  These factors provide part of the incentive for the companies within the prison 
industry to stretch into the political arena.  
According to the Collective Action theory those with greater resources within a 
group will carry a higher burden in the pursuit of a common goal, where the good to be 
derived is so great that they are willing to bear the cost of the burden.177 This is 
especially the case in “privileged groups,” that is small groups in which the members of a 
market are limited to only a handful.178 The theory explains that because the size of the 
group is small the problem of free riding is limited, therefore individual players who put 
in most or all of the efforts toward some endeavor will be less likely to lose the benefits 
of that endeavor to others who put in little effort.179 As a result, individual players who 
will gain a lot will not have too much of a problem with expending greater resources for 
fear of others reaping the rewards.180 
Such is the case in the Prison Privatization industry.  CCA and WCC control 75% 
of an industry that has only six legitimate members,181 thus it behooves them to take up 
the majority of the burden in terms of persuasion of the political system.  This is all the 
more obvious when considering the fact that CCA and WCC are both publicly traded 
companies within the industry.182 CCA and WCC trade on the New York Stock 
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Exchange (NYSE).183 Publicly traded companies sell stocks and bonds in order to gain 
additional funds that aid in raising capital for expansion and other endeavors which 
private companies miss out on.184 However, the sale of stocks and bonds at a beneficial 
rate depends on the company and its future value.185 As a result the CCA and WCC have 
more to gain and are thus more likely and willing to bear the burden of purchasing policy.  
b. Corrections Corporation of America and Its Political Influence
The state of the Prison Privatization industry has indeed provided an incentive for 
exerting political influence.  As the company with the largest market share,186 the 
Corrections Corporation of America has stood at the forefront of that endeavor.  However 
its participation has not been entirely direct.  
 The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is a non-partisan though 
ideologically conservative association.187 Its members include more than a third of the 
country’s state legislators.188 ALEC’s stated mission is to promote free markets, small 
government, states' rights, and privatization.189 ALEC members gather to swap ideas and 
form "model legislation."190 Legislators then take those "model" bills home and try to 
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make them state law.191 The ALEC conferences are co-sponsored by over a hundred 
private companies.192 These co-sponsors include companies like the Turner Construction 
Corporation, which is the number one builder of the nation’s prisons and the Wackenhut 
Corrections Corporation.193 Along with state legislators there are 200 “private-sector 
members.”194 These “private-sector members” pay dues for the privilege of helping 
legislative members write ALEC's model bills.195 
The Corrections Corporation of America is one of ALEC’s private-sector 
members.196 It is through participation in ALEC that CCA exerts its influence over the 
political system and the creation of legislation.  CCA claims that ALEC provides it with a 
means by which to communicate with legislators.197 CCA uses ALEC to express the 
benefits of Prison Privatization, or more specifically "that if [] states and counties have 
considerable overcrowding in their jails and prisons that partnering with a private 
corrections company can realize cost savings to their taxpayers and [CCA] can offer 
effective programming for their inmates."198 However CCA does more than just that. 
CCA pays ALEC $2,000 dollars a year for a spot on the ALEC Criminal Justice Task 
Force.199 In fact the task force’s co-chairman included a CCA official, Bradd Wiggins, 
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who was CCA’s Director of Business Development.200 Prior to Mr. Wiggins’ 
participation John Rees, CCA’s vice president, co-chaired the task force.201 
According to ALEC:  
[t]he Criminal Justice Task Force is dedicated to developing model 
policies that reduce both crime and violence in our cities and 
neighborhoods.  The Task Force is accomplishing this by approving 
model bills that hold criminals accountable for their actions and 
provide swift and certain punishment for their crimes.202 
This ideology has led the task force to push tough on crime legislation as well as 
promoting pro-private prison legislation.  Recently, for instance, the task force modeled 
the Habitual Offender/Three Strikes Act, which mandates life imprisonment for a third 
felony conviction.203 It has also modeled truth in sentencing acts which mandates 
prisoners serve 85% of their sentences.204 
c. The Conflict of Interest
There would be no issue of a possible conflict of interest within the prison 
privatization industry if CCA’s involvement within ALEC were in fact limited to merely 
communicating the advantages of prison privatization.  However, CCA’s position within 
ALEC allows it to sit with over 40% of the country’s state legislators.205 Additionally, 
CCA officials sitting as co-chairmen of the Criminal Justice Task Force depicts the 
strength of its position within ALEC.   
CCA indisputably has a hand in the creation of the model legislation that is 
created by ALEC and then pushed forward by member legislators in their respective 
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states.  That model legislation reflects a general disposition of being tough on crime.  The 
CCA requires tough on crime legislation in order to battle the risks for the prison 
privatization industry which it listed in its S.E.C. filing as the “short term nature of 
government contracts, dependence on government appropriations and dependence on 
government agencies for inmates.”206 In battling these risks the CCA and ALEC have 
been most successful in pushing forward two specific types of legislation: Truth in 
Sentencing legislation and Habitual Offender/Three strikes legislation.  
Truth in Sentencing Legislation, modeled by ALEC in 1995, has been passed in 
twenty-five states.207 Among these states are Nevada and New Hampshire.208 These 
state’s versions of the Truth in Sentencing legislation require that inmates serve 100 
percent of their sentence.209 Twenty of the remaining 23 states require that inmates serve 
eighty-five percent of their sentences.210 While CCA and ALEC’s modeled truth in 
sentencing laws passed in twenty-five states, the trend that they became so influencial 
that by the late 90’s forty states had truth in sentencing laws like those modeled by 
ALEC.211 
As a result of Truth in Sentencing laws, state inmate populations have increased 
through the incarceration of more offenders for longer periods of time.212 For example, 
shortly after Wisconsin passed truth in sentencing laws an “analysis by the state 
estimated that the 990 inmates imprisoned just in the first 21 months after the law took 
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effect would spend 18,384 additional months in jail.”213 Therefore, as more inmates enter 
into the system, those already in the system also remain in the system.  Not surprisingly, 
Wisconsin employs CCA to maintain private prisons housing those inmates.214 
Habitual Offender/Three Strikes legislation, modeled by ALEC, has been passed 
in eleven states.215 These laws require life imprisonment for those convicted of a felony 
for the third time.216 Because three-strikes laws arbitrarily sentence repeat offenders to 
longer sentences, they play a part in the “skyrocketing prison population.”217 Most 
importantly, however, is the fact that those being incarcerated by three strikes laws are 
not typically violent offenders.  For instance, an analysis of California’s 1994 three 
strikes law found that the majority of the 50,000 individuals incarcerated under the three 
strikes law were convicted of non-violent crimes.218 As a result, the influence of three 
strikes legislation has not been to make the streets safer but to increase the incarceration 
population and exacerbate the overcrowding problem.  The final result is greater demand 
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for the privatization industry because of legislation modeled by members of the prison 
privatization industry.    
ALEC’s criminal justice objectives stretch beyond just truth in sentencing laws 
and three strikes legislation.  In fact a list of ALEC’s legislative actions to fight crime 
include: sentencing for “actual conduct” in cases where a plea bargain had lead to 
conviction of a lesser crime, treating juveniles as adults for serious crimes, and requiring 
mandatory minimum sentencing.219 All of these would increase the number of 
individuals incarcerated in prisons and thus continue the need for prison privatization.   
The most compelling evidence of a conflict of interest may be found when 
comparing ALEC’s success in pushing tough on crime legislation into law, the increase 
in the numbers incarcerated, the decline in the actual crime rate, and the prison 
privatization’s increasing profits.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National 
Crime Victimization Survey violent crime rates have steadily declined since 1994 
reaching the lowest records ever recorded in 2005.220 In the same time frame 
incarceration rates have increased by twenty-four percent.221 Some may see these 
statistics as proof that tough on crime legislation, which increases incarceration is the 
reason for the decrease in crime rates.222 Yet between 1991 and 1998 those states that 
increased incarceration at rates that were less than the national average experienced a 
larger decline in crime rates than those states that increased incarceration at rates higher 
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than the national average.223 Additionally, trends between 1998 and 2003 continued to 
demonstrate no significant impact of increased incarceration rates on reducing crime.224 
The increase in incarceration rates were products of unnecessary legislation that 
had little or nothing to do with the decrease in crime rates.225 Such legislation included 
truth in sentencing laws, mandatory minimum laws, and three strikes legislation, all of 
which were pushed into law by ALEC and its criminal justice task force, headed up by 
CCA co-chairmen on the task force.226 The result of the superfluous and unnecessary 
tough on crime legislation that has exacerbated the overcrowding problem may be found 
in CCA’s earnings.  While the crime rate declined and the prison population increased 
during the 1990’s, CCA’s revenue in 2005 grew to 1,192,640,000227 from 21,404,000 in 
1994.228 Additionally CCA’s net income in 2005 was 50,122,000229 compared to 
1,381,000 in 1994.230 
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to make apparent the realities of prison privatization, for 
while there may be benefits to prison privatization there are the definitive disadvantages 
that also accompany it.  It is becoming more and more apparent that the disadvantages 
brought on by privatizing the prison system is one that mandates crime, criminals, and 
 
223 See The Sentencing Project, supra note 220.   
224 Id. 
225 Ken Silverstein, US: America’s Private Gulag, Corpwatch, (June 1, 2000) available at 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=867.   
226 See supra notes 183-205 and accompanying text for a discussion on CCA’s 
involvement in ALEC and ALEC’s involvement in prison legislation.  
227 Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (March 7, 
2006) 
228 Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Dec. 31, 
1994)  
229 Supra Corrections Corporation of America, note 227 
230 Supra Corrections Corporation of America, note 228 
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more prisons.  As a society we are required to ask whether we wish such a trend to be the 
kind that defines our penal characteristics.  It would not be far fetched to assume that we 
do not, which requires then an alternative means by which to solve the pre-existing issues 
plaguing our penal system.  While I have provided none here, I have shed light on the 
short comings of the solution that we have seemingly settled on.   
Legislators and state governments have sought the solution to overcrowded 
prisons and they found their solution in prison privatization.  Privatization companies are 
in the business of solving the prison population crisis in order to make a profit.  However 
if they do solve the problem then there would be no means by which to make profits, and 
that’s the “Catch 22”.  As a result, the privatization industry ensures that profits continue 
by pushing forth tough on crime legislation that ensures overcrowding continues, which 
is in direct conflict with the very purpose behind privatization of prisons. Hence lies the 
conflict of interest.   
 
